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THE DSM-5: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH LAW 
 
Stacey A. Tovino* 
 
Abstract 
 
In May 2013, the American Psychiatric Association released the fifth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(“DSM-5”). Among other changes, the DSM-5 includes new entries for 
hoarding disorder and premenstrual dysphoric disorder as well as a 
reclassified entry for gambling disorder. Using these changes as 
examples, this Article examines the implications of the DSM-5 for key 
issues in health law, including health insurance coverage, public and 
private disability benefit eligibility, and disability discrimination 
protection. As a descriptive matter, this Article illustrates how the addition 
of new disorders and the reclassification of existing disorders in the DSM-
5 can significantly impact health insurance coverage and has some 
relevance to disability benefit eligibility and disability discrimination 
protection. From a normative perspective, this Article offers guidelines 
designed to prevent attorneys, judges, and other nonclinicians from 
abusing the DSM-5 in civil and administrative health law proceedings. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In May 2013, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) released the fifth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the “DSM-
5”).1 Among other changes,2 the DSM-5 includes new entries for hoarding disorder3 
and premenstrual dysphoric disorder4 as well as a reclassified entry for gambling 
disorder.5 Using these changes as illustrators, this Article examines the implications 
of the DSM-5 for key issues in health law, including health insurance coverage, 
disability benefit eligibility, and disability discrimination protection.6  
As a descriptive matter, this Article shows how the addition of new disorders 
and the reclassification of existing disorders in the DSM-5 can significantly impact 
the application of federal and state mental health parity laws and mandatory mental 
health and substance use disorder benefit laws as well as the interpretation of health 
insurance contracts. Federal mental health parity law, some state benchmark plans, 
and many health insurance contracts incorporate by reference the current edition of 
                                                 
1 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5]. 
2 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-IV-TR TO DSM-5 
(2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, CHANGES], available at http://www.dsm5.org/ 
Documents/changes%20from%20dsm-iv-tr%20to%20dsm-5.pdf, archived at http://perma. 
cc/GD6G-NWDF (providing a detailed description of the changes between the DSM-IV-TR 
and the DSM-5). 
3 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 247–51 (listing hoarding disorder 
as a separate diagnosis within a new chapter relating to obsessive-compulsive and related 
disorders). 
4 Id. at 171–75 (listing premenstrual dysphoric disorder as a separate diagnosis within 
the depressive disorders chapter).  
5 Id. at 585–89 (listing gambling disorder as a separate disorder within a new 
nonsubstance-related disorders section of the substance-related and addictive disorders 
chapter). 
6 This Article draws on health insurance, disability benefit, and disability discrimination 
themes and arguments I have made in other articles. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses 
Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Tovino, All Illnesses]; Stacey A. Tovino, Further Support for 
Mental Health Parity Law and Mandatory Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder 
Benefits, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 147 (2012); Stacey A. Tovino, The Impact of Neuroscience 
on Health Law, 1 NEUROETHICS 101 (2008); Stacey A. Tovino, Insurance and Parity Laws, 
in 1 MENTAL HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 350, 350–57 (Michael 
Shally-Jensen ed., 2013); Stacey A. Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle: How Health and Disability 
Laws Hurt Disordered Gamblers, 89 TUL. L. REV. 191 (2014) [hereinafter Tovino, Lost in 
the Shuffle]; Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 
42 AKRON L. REV. 469, 472 (2009); Stacey A. Tovino, A Proposal for Comprehensive and 
Specific Essential Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 
471 (2012) [hereinafter Tovino, A Proposal]; Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental 
Health Parity Law, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455 (2011) [hereinafter Tovino, 
Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law]. 
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the DSM when identifying conditions that are eligible for parity protections, 
mandatory benefits, and insurance coverage, respectively. 
On the other hand, this Article demonstrates how the DSM-5 is usually not 
determinative with respect to the outcome of public disability benefit cases. In public 
disability benefit cases, the presence of a physical or mental impairment is simply a 
predicate to a more important legal determination; that is, whether the claimant’s 
impairment is of such severity that the claimant cannot do her previous work and 
cannot perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 
These secondary legal determinations are made based on proof provided by the 
claimant of her work limitations. Claimants who fail to provide objective evidence 
regarding their work limitations will not prevail regardless of whether their 
underlying conditions are listed in the current edition of the DSM. 
This Article further demonstrates how the DSM-5 is not necessarily 
determinative with respect to the outcome of private disability benefit cases, either. 
Although some private disability plans internally reference the current edition of the 
DSM for purposes of determining whether an insured has a mental disability, this 
finding of disability usually is a predicate to other legal determinations, such as 
whether the disability is the reason the insured is unable to work. In many cases, 
courts agree that the insured has a disability but find that something else, such as the 
insured’s commission of a crime, has made the insured ineligible to work. In these 
cases, the insured is not eligible for contractual disability benefits even if the 
insured’s disability is listed in the current edition of the DSM. 
As a final descriptive matter, this Article demonstrates how changes in the 
DSM-5 have not yet impacted the outcome of disability discrimination cases 
involving individuals with hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and 
gambling disorder. Although individuals with hoarding disorder and premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder have been considered individuals with disabilities in cases 
decided prior to the publication of the DSM-5, individuals with gambling disorder 
continue to be excluded from protection under federal and state antidiscrimination 
law, even after the DSM-5. In addition, individuals with disabilities still bear the 
burden of proving that they are qualified individuals who can perform the essential 
functions of their jobs with or without reasonable accommodation. The DSM-5 is 
unhelpful with respect to these and other prerequisites to antidiscrimination 
protection. 
As a normative matter, this Article agrees with the APA’s cautionary statement 
regarding legal uses of the DSM-5 given the different goals and objectives of law 
and medicine7 and the fact that the DSM-5 was designed for use by clinicians, public 
                                                 
7 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 25 (“However, the use of DSM-5 
should be informed by an awareness of the risks and limitations of its use in forensic settings. 
When DSM-5 categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for forensic 
purposes, there is a risk that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood. These 
dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the 
law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis. In most situations, the clinical 
diagnosis of a DSM-5 mental disorder . . . does not imply that an individual with such a 
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health professionals, and research investigators, not judges or attorneys.8 To this end, 
this Article raises new questions regarding legal uses of the DSM-5 and provides 
guidelines for attorneys and judges to follow to avoid abusing the DSM-5. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the DSM-5’s new entries for 
hoarding disorder and premenstrual dysphoric disorder and the DSM-5’s reclassified 
entry for gambling disorder. Parts III, IV, and V examine the impact of these changes 
with respect to health insurance coverage, disability benefit eligibility, and disability 
discrimination protection, respectively. Part VI analyzes whether the DSM-5 is 
being used or abused in civil and administrative health law proceedings and offers 
guidelines for future uses of the DSM by nonclinicians. 
 
II.  CHANGES IN THE DSM-5 
 
A.  Hoarding Disorder 
 
In the prior edition of the DSM (the “DSM-IV-TR”), the APA listed extreme 
hoarding behavior as a symptom of obsessive-compulsive disorder but did not 
contain a separate entry focused solely on hoarding.9 The DSM-5 is the first edition 
of the DSM to contain a separate chapter on obsessive-compulsive and related 
disorders10 and to include within that chapter a new disorder known as hoarding 
disorder.11 According to the APA, hoarding disorder is characterized by “persistent 
difficulty discarding or parting with possessions due to a perceived need to save the 
items and distress associated with discarding them.”12 Clinicians and scientists 
believe that hoarding disorder may have unique neurobiological correlates and may 
respond to clinical intervention.13 
                                                 
condition meets legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder or a specified legal 
standard (e.g., for competence, criminal responsibility, or disability).”). 
8 Id. (“[I]t is important to note that the definition of mental disorder included in DSM-
5 was developed to meet the needs of clinicians, public health professionals, and research 
investigators rather than all of the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.”). 
9 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 728 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR] 
(“A diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder should be considered especially when 
hoarding is extreme (e.g., accumulated stacks of worthless objects present a fire hazard and 
make it difficult for others to walk through the house).”); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
CHANGES, supra note 2, at 8 (“DSM-IV lists hoarding as one of the possible symptoms of 
obsessive-compulsive personality disorder and notes that extreme hoarding may occur in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder.”). 
10 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 235 (“The inclusion of a chapter 
on obsessive-compulsive and related disorders in DSM-5 reflects the increasing evidence of 
these disorders’ relatedness to one another in terms of a range of diagnostic validators as well 
as the clinical utility of grouping these disorders in the same chapter.”). 
11 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, CHANGES, supra note 2, at 8 (“Hoarding disorder is a new 
diagnosis in DSM-5.”).  
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
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Under the DSM-5, a clinician may diagnose an individual with hoarding 
disorder if the individual meets six criteria.14 First, the individual must have 
persistent difficulty discarding or parting with possessions, regardless of their actual 
value.15 Second, this difficulty must be due to the individual’s perceived need to 
save items and distress associated with discarding them.16 Third, the difficulty 
discarding possessions must result in the accumulation of possessions that congest 
and clutter active living areas and that substantially compromise their intended use.17 
(If living areas are uncluttered, it is only because of the interventions of third parties, 
such as family members, cleaners, or authorities.18) Fourth, the hoarding must cause 
the individual clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning, including maintaining a safe environment for 
the individual or others.19 Fifth, the hoarding cannot be attributable to another 
medical condition such as a brain injury, cerebrovascular disease, or Prader-Willi 
syndrome.20 Finally, the hoarding must not be better explained by the symptoms of 
another mental disorder, such as the obsessions in obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
decreased energy in major depressive disorder, delusions in schizophrenia, cognitive 
deficits in major neurocognitive disorder, or restricted interests in autism spectrum 
disorder.21 
Individuals with hoarding disorder frequently have difficulty moving through 
their cluttered houses as well as difficulty maintaining personal hygiene, cooking, 
cleaning, and sleeping.22 Individuals with severe hoarding disorder can be at risk of 
falling, poor sanitation, and even house fires.23 According to the APA, associations 
exist between hoarding disorder and occupational impairment, poor physical health, 
high social service utilization, strained family relationships, and conflict with 
neighbors and local authorities.24 The APA estimates that three-quarters of 
individuals with hoarding disorder have a comorbid disorder such as major 
depressive disorder, social anxiety disorder, or generalized anxiety disorder, and that 
approximately one in five individuals with hoarding disorder may meet diagnostic 
criteria for obsessive-compulsive disorder.25 
  
                                                 
14 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 247. 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 250. 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 251. 
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B.  Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder 
 
In the DSM-IV-TR, the APA listed premenstrual dysphoric disorder in 
Appendix B, an appendix that identified conditions that were under study but did 
not have sufficient evidence to warrant a separate diagnostic entry.26 In the DSM-5, 
the APA removed premenstrual dysphoric disorder from Appendix B and included 
it as a stand-alone entry within the Depressive Disorders chapter,27 which is newly 
separated from the Bipolar and Related Disorder chapter.28 According to the APA, 
“[t]he essential features of premenstrual dysphoric disorder are the expression of 
mood lability, irritability, dysphoria, and anxiety symptoms that occur repeatedly 
during the premenstrual phase of the cycle and remit around the onset of menses or 
shortly thereafter.”29 
For a diagnosis of premenstrual dysphoric disorder, the DSM-5 specifically 
requires, in the majority of an individual’s menstrual cycles during the preceding 
year: (A) at least five symptoms (1) to be present in the final week before the onset 
of menses, (2) to start to improve within a few days after the onset of menses, and 
(3) to become minimal or absent in the week postmenses.30 These symptoms include: 
(B) one or more of: (1) marked affective lability; (2) marked irritability or anger or 
increased interpersonal conflicts; (3) marked depressed mood, feelings of 
hopelessness, or self-deprecating thoughts; and (4) marked anxiety, tension, and/or 
feelings of being keyed up or on edge; and (C) one or more of the following 
symptoms, to reach a total of five symptoms when combined with the symptoms in 
(B): (1) decreased interest in usual activities, such as work, school, friends, or 
hobbies; (2) subjective difficulty in concentration; (3) lethargy, easy fatigability, or 
marked lack of energy; (4) overeating, specific food cravings, or marked change in 
appetite; (5) hypersomnia or insomnia; (6) a sense of being overwhelmed or out of 
control; and (7) physical symptoms such as breast tenderness or swelling, joint or 
muscle pain, a sensation of bloating, or weight gain.31 
In addition to the presence of five of these symptoms at the specified time 
periods, the DSM-5 also would require: (1) the symptoms to be associated with 
clinically significant distress or interference with work, school, usual social 
activities, or relationships with others; (2) the disturbance to be not merely an 
exacerbation of the symptoms of another disorder, such as major depressive 
                                                 
26 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 9, at 11, 703, 715–18.  
27 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 171–75 (listing premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder within the depressive disorders); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, CHANGES, 
supra note 2, at 4 (“DSM-5 contains several new depressive disorders, including disruptive 
mood dysregulation disorder and premenstrual dysphoric disorder.”). 
28 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 155 (“Unlike in DSM-IV, this 
chapter ‘Depressive Disorders’ has been separated from the previous chapter ‘Bipolar and 
Related Disorders.’”). 
29 Id. at 172. 
30 Id. at 171–72 (listing the diagnostic criteria for premenstrual dysphoric disorder). 
31 Id. at 171–72. 
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disorder, panic disorder, persistent depressive disorder, or a personality disorder, 
although it may co-occur with any of these disorders; and (3) the symptoms not to 
be attributable to the physiological effects of a substance or another medical 
condition.32 
The APA estimates that the twelve-month prevalence of premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder is between 1.8% and 5.8% of menstruating women.33 
Premenstrual dysphoric disorder has several negative functional consequences, 
including clinically meaningful distress and/or an obvious and marked impairment 
in the ability to function socially or occupationally in the week prior to menses.34  
 
C.  Gambling Disorder35 
 
First recognized by the APA in the DSM-III in 1980,36 a condition then named 
“pathological gambling” was classified within the disorders of impulse control not 
elsewhere classified chapter.37 Characterized with reference to an individual’s 
“chronic and progressive failure to resist impulses to gamble and gambling behavior 
that compromises, disrupts, or damages personal, family, or vocational pursuits,” 
pathological gambling was believed by the APA to have an adolescent age of onset 
and to be more common among males than females and more common in the fathers 
of males and in the mothers of females.38 Predisposing factors were thought to 
include loss of parent by death, separation, divorce, or desertion before the 
individual turned fifteen years of age; inappropriate parental discipline; exposure to 
gambling activities as an adolescent; a high family value on material and financial 
symbols; and lack of family emphasis on saving, planning, and budgeting.39 
Pathological gambling remained in the disorders of impulse control not elsewhere 
classified sections of the DSM-III-R (1987), the DSM-IV (1994), and the DSM-IV-
TR (2000).40 
The DSM-5 takes pathological gambling in a new direction. First, the DSM-5 
renames the condition “gambling disorder,”41 reflecting concerns that the adjective 
“pathological” is pejorative and reinforces the social stigma associated with problem 
                                                 
32 Id. at 172. 
33 Id. at 173. 
34 Id. at 174. 
35 The next three paragraphs were first printed at Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle, supra note 
6, at 196–97, 200–201. Slight technical and conforming changes have been made.  
36 See Randy Stinchfield, Reliability, Validity, and Classification Accuracy of a 
Measure of DSM-IV Diagnostic Criteria for Pathological Gambling, 160 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 180, 180 (2003) (“Pathological gambling was formally recognized as a mental 
disorder by APA in DSM-III.”). 
37 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 291–93 (3d. ed. 1980). 
38 Id. at 291–92. 
39 Id. at 292.  
40 Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle, supra note 6, at 196–204. 
41 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 585. 
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gambling.42 Second, the DSM-5 reclassifies gambling disorder and places it as the 
sole disorder within the nonsubstance-related disorders section within the larger 
Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders chapter.43 Now, gambling disorder 
follows alcohol use disorder, cannabis use disorder, opioid use disorder, stimulant 
use disorder, and tobacco use disorder, among other substance-related and addictive 
disorders.44 
According to the APA, the change in gambling disorder’s classification reflects 
neuroimaging evidence that gambling behaviors activate neural reward systems 
similar to those activated by drugs of abuse and produces behavioral systems that 
appear comparable to those produced by the substance use disorders.45 Dr. Charles 
O’Brien, who chaired the Substance-Related Disorders Work Group for the DSM-
5, explains:  
 
The idea of a non-substance-related addiction may be new to some people, 
but those of us who are studying the mechanisms of addiction find strong 
evidence from animal and human research that addiction is a disorder of 
the brain reward system, and it doesn’t matter whether the system is 
repeatedly activated by gambling or alcohol or another substance . . . . In 
functional brain imaging—whether with gamblers or drug addicts—when 
they are showed video or photograph cues associated with their addiction, 
the same brain areas are activated.46 
 
According to the APA, gambling disorder has a past-year prevalence rate of 
0.2% to 0.3% as well as a lifetime prevalence rate of 0.4% to 1.0% among the general 
population.47 The functional consequences of gambling disorder include, but are not 
limited to, loss of important relationships and adverse impact on work or school 
                                                 
42 See CHRISTINE REILLY & NATHAN SMITH, NAT’L CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE GAMING, 
THE EVOLVING DEFINITION OF PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING IN THE DSM-5, at 4 (2013), 
available at http://www.ncrg.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/white_papers/ncrg_wpdsm 
5_may2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LR7E-2LJ6; Nancy M. Petry et al., An 
Overview of and Rationale for Changes Proposed for Pathological Gambling in DSM-5, 30 
J. GAMBLING STUD. 493, 494 (2014) (“Over the past three decades, the term ‘pathological’ 
has become outdated and pejorative. Thus, the name of the disorder will be altered in DSM-
5 to ‘gambling disorder.’”). 
43 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 481. 
44 Id. at 483–585; Constance Holden, Behavioral Addictions Debut in Proposed DSM-
V, 327 SCIENCE 935 (2010) (noting that gambling disorder would be the only disorder in the 
behavioral, or nonsubstance, portion of the substance-related and addictive disorders 
category). 
45 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 481; see also Kenneth Blum et 
al., Reward Deficiency Syndrome, 84 AM. SCIENTIST 132, 140 (1996) (noting the affinities 
between pathological gambling and alcohol and drug abuse). 
46 Mark Moran, Gambling Disorder to be Included in Addictions Chapter, 
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2013, at 5, 5. 
47 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 1, at 587. 
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performance.48 Gambling disorder is associated with poor general health and high 
utilization of medical services.49 
 
III.  HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
 
This Part demonstrates how the addition of hoarding disorder and premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder and the reclassification of gambling disorder in the DSM-5 can 
significantly impact the application of health insurance laws, including federal and 
state mental health parity laws and mandatory mental health and substance use 
disorder benefit laws, as well as the interpretation of health insurance contracts. 
Some background information is necessary before proceeding to these points. 
Historically, many public health care programs and private health plans 
distinguished between physical and mental disorders and provided inferior insurance 
benefits for mental disorders.50 For example, Medicare Part B formerly imposed a 
50% beneficiary coinsurance on outpatient mental health services, including 
individual, family, and group psychotherapy services, instead of the 20% beneficiary 
coinsurance traditionally applied to nonmental health outpatient services.51 Private 
health plans also used to provide inferior health insurance benefits for individuals 
with mental disorders by completely excluding their treatments and services from 
                                                 
48 Id. at 589. 
49 Id.  
50 Tovino, A Proposal, supra note 6, at 475; Tovino, All Illnesses, supra note 6, at 3. 
Much of the background information regarding mental health parity law and mandated 
benefit law set forth in the next sixteen paragraphs were previously published in the 
following articles, although technical and conforming changes have been made: Tovino, All 
Illnesses, supra note 6, at 3–9; Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle, supra note 6, at 213–24; Tovino, 
A Proposal, supra note 6, at 481–97. 
51 See Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
275, § 102, 122 Stat. 2494, 2498 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §1395l(c) (2012)) 
(calculating Medicare incurred expenses as only 62.5% of the outpatient expenses associated 
with the treatment of mental, psychoneurotic, and personality disorders). Until 2010, 
Medicare was thus responsible for only 50% (i.e., 62.5% x 80%, with 80% being the 
Medicare approved amount) of the cost of most outpatient mental health services, and the 
Medicare beneficiary was responsible for the remaining 50%. Id. In 2008, President George 
W. Bush signed into law the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, 
Section 102 of which increased Medicare’s portion of incurred expenses for outpatient 
mental health services to 68.75% in 2010 and 2011 (resulting in a 45% beneficiary 
coinsurance), 75% in 2012 (resulting in a 40% beneficiary coinsurance), 81.25% in 2013 
(resulting in a 35% beneficiary coinsurance), and 100% in 2014 and thereafter (resulting in 
a 20% coinsurance). Id. Since 2014, Medicare has been paying 80% of (and Medicare 
beneficiaries are only paying a 20% coinsurance on) all outpatient mental health services. 
See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE GENERAL INFORMATION, 
ELIGIBILITY, AND ENTITLEMENT MANUAL ch. 3, § 30 (rev. ed. 2014), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/ge101c03 
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HZ9L-8MZB. 
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coverage or by providing less comprehensive coverage of their treatments and 
services.52  
Historically, these health insurance benefit disparities existed in the context of 
many mental disorders, including hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric 
disorder, and gambling disorder. For example, Kaiser Permanente’s 2012 Small 
Group Colorado Health Benefit Plan (“Kaiser Plan”) provided insurance coverage 
of “biologically-based mental illnesses,” but the Kaiser Plan only included six 
illnesses (i.e., schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar affective disorder, 
major depressive disorder, specific obsessive-compulsive disorder, and panic 
disorder) within that definition.53 Hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric 
disorder, and gambling disorder were not included in that definition. 
UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company’s standard Certificate of Coverage also 
provided coverage for “biologically-based mental illnesses,” but similarly defined 
the phrase to include schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, pervasive developmental 
disorder, autism, paranoia, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 
major depressive disorder.54 Again, hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric 
disorder, and gambling disorder were not included in this definition. 
Some private health plans specifically excluded one or more of these three 
conditions from coverage. For example, Wellmark South Dakota’s Blue Priority 
HSA Plan expressly excluded pathological gambling from coverage.55 The 2013–
2014 Student Injury and Sickness Insurance Plan for students attending Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida also expressly excluded from coverage 
treatments and services for gambling.56 The University of Pittsburgh Medical 
                                                 
52 See Tovino, A Proposal, supra note 6, at 475; Tovino, All Illnesses, supra note 6, at 
3. 
53 KAISER PERMANENTE, 2012 COLORADO HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN DESCRIPTION FORM 
pt. B.18 & n.9 (2012), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata& 
blobheadername1=Content-Disposition&blobheadername2=Content-Type&blobheader 
value1=inline%3B+filename%3D%22Option+A-Kaiser+Permanente+(Small+Group)+ 
Summary+Description+Form.pdf%22&blobheadervalue2=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=i
d&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251815021667&ssbinary=true, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K9LB-Y95V (defining biologically based mental illness). 
54 UNITEDHEALTHCARE INS. CO., CERTIFICATE OF COVERAGE 17–18, available at 
https://www.uhc.com/content/dam/uhcdotcom/en/Legal/PDF/MY-7.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/CBE9-EXL4 (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
55 See WELLMARK S.D., BLUE SELECT HSA-QUALIFIED PPO PLANS: OUTLINE OF 
COVERAGE FOR NON-GRANDFATHERED PLANS 9 (2012), available at 
http://www.wellmark.com/SouthDakotaPlans/OOC/BluePriorityHSA_M31118_10_12.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AN85-9QNJ (excluding certain mental health and chemical 
dependency services, including “Impulse-control disorders (such as pathological 
gambling)”). 
56 See UNITEDHEALTHCARE INS. CO., CERTIFICATE OF COVERAGE: 2013–2014 
STUDENT INJURY & SICKNESS INSURANCE PLAN 16 (2013), available at 
https://www.uhcsr.com/uhcsrBrochures/Public/ClientBrochures/2013-735-2-3%20 
Brochure-v3.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/TEV6-YB5D (excluding coverage for 
“treatment, services or supplies for . . . [a]ddiction, such as[] nicotine addiction, except as 
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Center’s health plan also excluded from coverage treatments for gambling 
disorder.57 Although many states have enacted parity laws designed to put mental 
health conditions on equal footing with physical health conditions, some of these 
parity laws specifically excluded gambling disorder from protection as well.58 New 
Mexico’s parity law, for example, requires group health plans in New Mexico to 
provide “mental health benefits” (and to provide them at parity with “medical and 
surgical benefits”);59 however, the New Mexico law specifically excludes treatments 
for gambling addiction from the definition of “mental health benefits.”60 
During the past two decades, developments in health insurance law, including 
mental health parity law and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder 
benefit law, have eliminated most, but still not all, of these mental health benefit 
disparities. The federal government took its first step toward establishing mental 
health parity on September 26, 1996, when President Bill Clinton signed the federal 
Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) into law.61 As originally enacted, the MHPA 
prohibited large group health plans that offered medical and surgical benefits as well 
as mental health benefits from imposing more stringent lifetime and annual spending 
limits on their offered mental health benefits.62 For example, the MHPA would have 
prohibited a large group health plan from imposing a $20,000 annual cap or a 
$100,000 lifetime cap on mental health care if the plan had no annual or lifetime 
caps for medical and surgical care or if the plan had higher caps, such as a $50,000 
annual cap or a $500,000 lifetime cap, for medical and surgical care.63 
                                                 
specifically provided in the policy and caffeine addiction; non-chemical addiction, such as[] 
gambling, sexual, spending, shopping, working and religious; [and] codependency”). 
57 See UPMC HEALTH PLAN, EXCLUSIONS 1, available at http://www.upmchealthplan. 
com/pdf/Exclusions.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FZR6-DUHG (last visited Jan. 30, 
2015) (excluding from insurance coverage “[t]welve step model programs as sole therapy 
for conditions, including, but not limited to . . . addictive gambling”). 
58 See, e.g., Nancy Bateman, Behavioral Healthcare Parity, NAT’L ASS’N SOC. 
WORKERS, http://www.naswdc.org/practice/behavioral_health/behavioral.asp, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HMU3-FPW4 (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (“New Mexico’s parity legislation 
provides coverage for all mental health, but excludes coverage for substance abuse and 
gambling.”). 
59 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-23E-18(A) (1978 & Supp. 2000) (“A group health plan . . . 
shall provide both medical and surgical benefits and mental health benefits. The plan shall 
not impose treatment limitations or financial requirements on the provision of mental health 
benefits if identical limitations or requirements are not imposed on coverage of benefits for 
other conditions.”). 
60 Id. § 59A-23E-18(F) (defining “mental health benefits” as “mental health benefits as 
described in the group health plan, or group health insurance offered in connection with the 
plan; but [not including] . . . benefits with respect to treatment of substance abuse, chemical 
dependency or gambling addiction” (emphasis added)). 
61 See Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944, 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012)). 
62 See id. § 712(a)(1), (2). 
63 See id. 
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The problem with the MHPA was that its application and scope were very 
limited. As originally enacted, the MHPA regulated only insured and self-insured 
group health plans of large employers, then defined as those employers that 
employed an average of fifty-one or more employees.64 The MHPA thus did not 
apply to the group health plans of small employers.65 The MHPA also did not apply 
to individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid nonmanaged care plans, 
or any self-funded, nonfederal governmental plan whose sponsor opted out of the 
MHPA.66 Finally, the MHPA contained an “increased cost” exemption for covered 
group health plans or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such 
plans if the application of the MHPA resulted in an increase in the cost under the 
plan of at least 1%.67 By November 1998, over two years following the MHPA’s 
enactment, only four plans across the United States had obtained exemptions due to 
cost increases of 1% or more.68 
In terms of its substantive provisions, the MHPA was neither a mandated offer 
nor a mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in the MHPA required a large group 
health plan to actually offer or provide any mental health benefits for conditions 
such as hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, or gambling disorder.69 
Thus, health plans were free, even after the enactment of the MHPA, to simply not 
provide any benefits for these three conditions or any other mental health 
condition.70 As originally enacted, the MHPA also was not a comprehensive parity 
law because it expressly excluded from protection individuals with substance use 
and addictive disorders, such as alcohol use disorder and other drug use disorders.71 
In addition, the MHPA did not require parity between medical and surgical benefits 
                                                 
64 See id. § 712(b)(1), (2) (applying in each case to “a group health plan (or health 
insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan)”). 
65 See id. § 712(c)(1)(A), (B) (exempting from the MHPA application group health 
plans of small employers; defining small employers as those who employed an average of at 
least two but not more than fifty employees on business days during the preceding calendar 
year and who employs at least two employees on the first day of the plan year). 
66 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21(a)(2)(A) (permitting sponsors of self-insured 
nonfederal governmental health plans to opt out of particular federal requirements); 45 
C.F.R. § 146.180(a)(1)(v) (2013) (permitting sponsors of self-insured, nonfederal 
governmental health plans to opt out of federal mental health parity requirements). 
67 MHPA § 712(c)(2). 
68 See Colleen L. Barry, The Political Evolution of Mental Health Parity, 14 HARV. 
REV. PSYCHIATRY 185, 187 (2006). 
69 See MHPA § 712(b)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed . . . as requiring 
a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan) to 
provide any mental health benefits . . . .”). 
70 See id. 
71 See id. § 712(e)(4) (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ means benefits with respect 
to mental health services, as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage (as the case may 
be), but does not include benefits with respect to treatment of substance abuse or chemical 
dependency.”).  
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and mental health benefits in terms of deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, 
inpatient day limitations, or outpatient visit limitations.72 
Because of these limitations, President George W. Bush expanded the MHPA 
twelve years later by signing into law the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental 
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA).73 The MHPAEA built 
on the MHPA by expressly protecting individuals with substance-related and 
addictive disorders and by imposing comprehensive parity requirements on large 
group health plans.74 In particular, the MHPAEA provided that any financial 
requirements (including deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and other out-of-
pocket expenses)75 and treatment limitations (including inpatient day and outpatient 
visit limitations)76 that large group health plans imposed on mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits must not be any more restrictive than the 
predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations imposed by the plan 
on substantially all medical and surgical benefits.77 The MHPAEA thus would have 
prohibited a large group health plan from imposing higher deductibles, copayments, 
or coinsurances, or lower inpatient day and outpatient visit maximums, on 
individuals seeking care for any mental health or substance use disorder listed in the 
current edition of the DSM or the International Classification of Diseases (ICD).78 
The previous sentence is very important: if a covered large group health plan actually 
                                                 
72 See id. § 712(b)(2) (“Nothing in this Section shall be construed . . . as affecting the 
terms and conditions (including cost sharing, limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, 
and requirements relating to medical necessity) relating to the amount, duration, or scope of 
mental health benefits under the plan or coverage . . . .”). 
73 See Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity 
Act (MHPAEA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 9812 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012)). 
74 See id. § 512(a)(4) (adding a new definition of “substance use disorder benefits”); id. 
§ 512(a)(1) (regulating the financial requirements and treatment limitations that are applied 
to both mental health and substance use disorder benefits). 
75 See id. § 512(a)(1) (including within the definition of “financial requirements” 
deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket expenses).  
76 See id. (including within the definition of “treatment limitations” limits on the 
frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, and other similar limits on the 
scope or duration of treatment). 
77 See id. (requiring both financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to 
mental health and substance use disorder benefits to be “no more restrictive than the 
predominant financial requirements” and treatment limitations applied to substantially all 
physical health benefits covered by the plan). 
78 See, e.g., Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,240, 68,286–87 (Nov. 13, 2013) 
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 146 and 147) (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 146.136, a federal 
regulation implementing the MHPAEA that requires a plan’s definition of “mental health 
benefits” and “substance use disorder benefits” to be “consistent with generally recognized 
independent standards of current medical practice (for example, the most current version of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the most current version 
of the ICD, or State guidelines).”). 
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offered insurance benefits for hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, 
or gambling disorder, then the DSM-5’s inclusion of these conditions now means 
that the health plan would be prohibited from imposing higher financial 
requirements or more stringent treatment limitations on individuals seeking services 
for these conditions.  
Like the MHPA, the MHPAEA’s application and scope were very limited. As 
originally enacted, the MHPAEA regulated only insured and self-insured group 
health plans of large employers, defined as those employers that employ an average 
of fifty-one or more employees.79 The MHPAEA, like the MHPA, did not apply to 
small group health plans, individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid 
nonmanaged care plans, or any self-funded, nonfederal governmental plans whose 
sponsors had opted out of the MHPAEA.80 In terms of its substantive provisions, the 
MHPAEA also was neither a mandated offer nor a mandated benefit law; nothing in 
the MHPAEA required a covered group health plan to actually offer or provide any 
benefits for conditions such as hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, 
or gambling disorder, even after the publication of the DSM-5.81 Like the MHPA, 
                                                 
79 MHPAEA § 512(a)(1) (stating that the MHPAEA applies only to group health plans 
or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such plans). 
80 See Ctr. for Consumer Oversight & Ins. Oversight, The Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Other-Insurance-Protections/mhpaea 
_factsheet.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9FHQ-7GLH (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) 
[hereinafter CMS, MHPAEA] (“MHPAEA does not apply directly to small group health 
plans . . . .”). The CMS further notes that Medicare and Medicaid are not issuers of health 
insurance: “They are public health plans through which individuals obtain health coverage. 
. . . Medicaid benchmark benefit plans, [however,] . . . require compliance with certain 
requirements of MHPAEA.” Id. “Non-Federal governmental employers that provide self-
funded group health plan coverage to their employees (coverage that is not provided through 
an insurer) may elect to exempt their plan (opt-out) from the requirements of MHPAEA . . . 
.” Id.; Colleen L. Barry et al., A Political History of Federal Mental Health and Addiction 
Insurance Parity, 88 MILBANK Q. 404, 407 (2010) (explaining that MHPAEA applies to 
Medicare Advantage coverage offered through a group health plan, Medicaid managed care, 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, and state and local government plans, but 
not Medicaid nonmanaged care plans); Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., to State Health Officials 2 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/SMDL/downloads/SHO110409.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/A4 
AH-W3N9 (“The MHPAEA requirements apply to Medicaid only insofar as a State’s 
Medicaid agency contracts with one or more managed care organizations (MCOs) or Prepaid 
Inpatient Health Plans (PIHPs), to provide medical/surgical benefits as well as mental health 
or substance use disorder benefits . . . . MHPAEA parity requirements do not apply to the 
Medicaid State plan if a State does not use MCOs or PIHPs to provide these benefits.”). 
81 See MHPAEA § 512(a)(1) (regulating only those group health plans that offer both 
physical health and mental health benefits); Implementation of the Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA), SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 
ADMIN., http://www.samhsa.gov/health-financing/implementation-mental-health-parity-
addiction-equity-act, archived at http://perma.cc/TQ8R-JN38 (last updated Sept. 24, 2014) 
(noting that “[s]elf-insured non-federal government employee plans can opt out of the federal 
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the MHPAEA also contained an “increased cost” exemption for covered group 
health plans and health insurance coverage offered in connection with such plans, 
but under MHPAEA the amount of the required cost increase increased, at least for 
the first year.82 That is, a covered plan that could demonstrate a cost increase of at 
least 2% in the first plan year and 1% in each subsequent plan year of the actual total 
costs of coverage with respect to medical and surgical benefits and mental health 
and substance use disorder benefits would be eligible for an exemption from the 
MHPAEA for such year.83 The MHPAEA required determinations of exemption-
qualifying cost increases to be made and certified in writing by a qualified and 
licensed actuary who in good standing belongs to the American Academy of 
Actuaries.84 
Before President Barack Obama signed the health care reform bill into law, 
mental health insurance benefits were regulated by the MHPA as expanded by the 
MHPAEA, as well as by more stringent state law.85 Unless a more stringent state 
law required a health plan to provide hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric 
disorder, or gambling disorder benefits (and state laws uniformly did not), a health 
plan was not required to provide such benefits. 
In late March 2010, President Obama responded to this limitation by signing 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) into law (as consolidated, the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA)).86 Best known for its controversial individual health insurance 
mandate,87 the ACA has two sets of provisions that relate to mental health parity and 
mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits. Upheld by the 
Supreme Court of the United States on June 28, 2012,88 these two sets of provisions 
improve upon some of the limitations of the MHPA and MHPAEA. 
The first set of the ACA provisions extends the MHPA’s and MHPAEA’s 
mental health parity provisions to the individual and small group health plans offered 
                                                 
parity law” and that the MHPAEA’s requirements do not apply to “[s]mall employer plans 
created before March 23, 2010,” “[c]hurch-sponsored plans and self-insured plans sponsored 
by state and local governments,” “[r]etiree-only plans,” TriCare, Medicare, and “[t]raditional 
Medicaid (fee-for-service, nonmanaged care)”); CMS, MHPAEA, supra note 80 (noting the 
same limitations). 
82 See MHPAEA § 512(a)(3) (establishing new cost exemption provisions).  
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See Tovino, Mental Health Parity Law, supra note 6, at 455, at 461–78 (describing 
the patchwork of state mental health parity law and providing examples of state laws that are 
more and less stringent than federal law). 
86 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
87 Id. § 5000(a), 124 Stat. at 244 (adding the following to the Internal Revenue Code: 
“[a]n applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the 
individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered 
under minimum essential coverage for such month.”). 
88 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
782 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
on and off the health insurance exchanges.89 Now, many individual and small group 
health plans that previously discriminated against individuals with hoarding 
disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and gambling disorder through higher 
deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance rates, as well as lower inpatient day and 
outpatient visit limitations, must comply with the MHPA and MHPAEA.90 
The second set of relevant ACA provisions requires certain health plans to 
actually provide mental health and substance use disorder benefits. The ACA now 
requires individual and small group health plans,91 exchange-offered qualified health 
plans,92 state basic health plans,93 and Medicaid benchmark plans94 to offer “[m]ental 
health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment” 
in addition to nine other categories of essential health benefits (EHBs).95 
Unfortunately, not every individual with health insurance will benefit from these ten 
required EHB categories because grandfathered health plans, large group health 
plans, and self-insured health plans are exempt from the requirement to provide the 
ten EHB categories.96 
                                                 
89 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012) (noting that former 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 was transferred 
to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26); ACA § 1311(j) (“[MHPAEA] shall apply to qualified health plans 
in the same manner and to the same extent as such section applies to health insurance issuers 
and group health plans.”); ACA § 1563(c)(4) (identifying the conforming and technical 
changes that will be made to former 42 U.S.C. 300gg-5, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
26); see also CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS 
BULLETIN 12 (2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads 
/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2LM9-MLHE (“The 
Affordable Care Act also specifically extends MHPAEA to the individual market.”). 
90 See sources cited supra note 89. 
91 ACA § 1201(2)(A) (noting amendments to the Public Health Service Act § 2707(a)) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a)). 
92 Id. § 1301(a)(1)(B) (adding new 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B)). 
93 Individuals eligible for state basic health plan coverage include individuals who are 
not eligible for Medicaid and whose household income falls between 133% and 200% of the 
federal poverty line for the family involved as well as low-income legal resident immigrants. 
Id. § 1331(e). 
94 Id. § 2001(c)(3) (adding new 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(5)). 
95 Id. § 1302(b)(1)(A)–(J). 
96 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating 
to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,562 (June 17, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590) 
(adopting 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a), which defines “grandfathered health plan 
coverage” as “coverage provided by a group health plan, or a health insurance issuer, in 
which an individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010”); id. at 34,559 (explaining that Public 
Health Service Act § 2707 does not apply to grandfathered health plans); id. at 34,568 
(adopting 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(c)(1), which states that “the provisions of PHS Act 
section[] . . . 2707 . . . do not apply to grandfathered health plans.”)); U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
APPLICATION OF THE NEW HEALTH REFORM PROVISIONS OF PART A OF TITLE XXVII OF THE 
PHS ACT TO GRANDFATHERED PLANS 1, available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/grand 
fatherregtable.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9GXN-RTCJ (explaining that ACA’s 
essential benefit package requirement is not applicable to grandfathered plans); see INST. OF 
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For those health plans that must provide benefits within the ten EHB categories, 
the statutory EHB requirements are unclear as to whether particular benefits, such 
as hoarding disorder benefits, premenstrual dysphoric disorder benefits, or gambling 
disorder benefits, are required. As a result, the federal Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) issued final regulations implementing the ACA’s EHB 
requirements (“Final Regulations”) on February 25, 2013.97 These Final Regulations 
required states to select (or be defaulted into) a benchmark plan98 that provides 
coverage for the ten EHB categories, including mental health and substance use 
disorder services,99 and that will serve as a reference plan for health plans in the 
state. According to the Final Regulations, health plans in the state that are required 
to provide the ten EHB categories shall provide health benefits that are substantially 
equal to those provided by the state’s benchmark plan, including the benchmark 
plan’s covered benefits and excluded benefits.100 Thus, the question of whether a 
particular health insurance policy or plan must provide benefits for a particular 
mental disorder, such as hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, or 
gambling disorder, under the ACA requires an analysis of whether the plan is 
required to provide the ten EHB categories as well as the content of each state’s 
selected benchmark plan. 
This is where the APA’s addition of new and reclassification of old mental 
disorders in the DSM-5 comes into play. Since I live and work in Las Vegas, I will 
use the State of Nevada’s current benchmark plan to illustrate the application of 
these rules. Nevada’s current benchmark plan is the Health Plan of Nevada Point of 
Service Group 1 C XV 500 HCR Plan (“Nevada Benchmark Plan”).101 If, as written 
on March 31, 2012, the Nevada Benchmark Plan included hoarding disorder, 
premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and gambling disorder benefits, then individual, 
                                                 
MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST 19 (2012) (listing 
the health plan settings to which ACA’s EHB requirement do not apply); Sara Rosenbaum 
et al., The Essential Health Benefits Provisions of the Affordable Care Act: Implications for 
People with Disabilities, COMMONWEALTH FUND, Mar. 2011, at 1, 3 (“The act exempts 
large-group health plans, as well as self-insured [Employee Retirement Income Security Act] 
plans and ERISA-governed multiemployer welfare arrangements not subject to state 
insurance law, from the essential benefit requirements.”). 
97 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health 
Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,834 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, and 156). 
98 Id. at 12,866 (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 156.100). 
99 Id. (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 156.110(a)(5)). 
100 Id. at 12,867 (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 156.115(a)). 
101 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NEVADA EHB BENCHMARK PLAN, 
available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/nevada-
ehb-benchmark-plan.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2KF6-6WUJ [hereinafter NEVADA 
EHB BENCHMARK PLAN]; Letter from Scott J. Kipper, Comm’r, Div. of Ins., Dep’t of Bus. 
& Indus., State of Nev., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 
2 (Dec. 14, 2012), available at http://doi.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/doinvgov/_public-
documents/Healthcare-Reform/12.14.12_kipper_letter_re_ehb.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/C6TH-SS7F (identifying Nevada’s Benchmark Plan selection). 
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small group, and other health plans in Nevada that are required to provide the ten 
EHB categories must provide benefits for these conditions in years 2014, 2015, and 
2016.102 On the other hand, if the Nevada Benchmark Plan did not include hoarding 
disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and gambling disorder benefits on March 
31, 2012, then benefits for these disorders are not essential health benefits in Nevada, 
and individuals with these disorders will not have coverage in years 2014, 2015, and 
2016 unless their health plans voluntarily include such benefits103 or unless they can 
access separate state funds for relevant treatments and services.104 
On March 31, 2012, the Nevada Benchmark Plan included coverage for 
outpatient and inpatient treatment of mental health conditions, including substance-
related conditions (such as alcohol use disorder and the drug use disorders).105 
Because the then-current edition of the DSM—the DSM-IV-TR—did not include 
hoarding disorder and premenstrual dysphoric disorder as mental disorders, the 
Nevada Benchmark Plan could be interpreted to exclude coverage for treatments for 
these conditions, at least for years 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
In addition, on March 31, 2012, the Nevada Benchmark Plan also excluded 
coverage for a class of mental health conditions known as the “impulse control 
disorders.”106 Because the then-current edition of the DSM—the DSM-IV-TR—
classified “pathological gambling” as an impulse control disorder, the result is that 
the Nevada Benchmark Plan excludes coverage for treatments of gambling 
disorders, at least for years 2014, 2015, and 2016. In other words, in years 2014, 
2015, and 2016, Nevada residents and residents of other states with similar 
benchmark plan limitations107 will not benefit from any mandatory gambling 
disorder benefits and will only have them to the extent their health plans voluntarily 
                                                 
102 See E-mail from Glenn Shippey, Nev. Div. of Ins., to author (Oct. 3, 2013, 8:37 AM) 
(on file with the Utah Law Review) [hereinafter Shippey Email] (explaining the application 
of the EHB requirements in the State of Nevada).  
103 See Amanda Cassidy, Essential Health Benefits. States Have Determined the 
Minimum Set of Benefits to be Included in Individual and Small-Group Insurance Plans. 
What’s Next?, HEALTH AFF., May 2, 2013, at 1, 2 (noting that HHS has indicated that the 
benchmark plan approach may be changed in 2016 and in future years based on evaluation 
and feedback). 
104 See, e.g., BO J. BERNHARD & SARAH ST. JOHN, SOC. HEALTH OF NEV., PROBLEM 
GAMBLING AND TREATMENT IN NEVADA 4–5 (2012), available at http://digitalscholarship. 
unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=social_health_nevada_reports, 
archived at http://perma.cc/CF57-VXRP (discussing problem gambling treatments that are 
partially or fully supported by the State of Nevada). 
105 See NEVADA EHB BENCHMARK PLAN, supra note 101, at 3. 
106 See Shippey Email, supra note 102 (noting the Nevada Benchmark Plan’s exclusion 
of “impulse control disorders”).  
107 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., IOWA EHB BENCHMARK PLAN 
4, available at https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/iowa-
ehb-benchmark-plan.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/6P4Q-NV25 (excluding from 
coverage “[c]ommunication disorders, impulse control disorders, sexual identification or 
gender disorders, and residential facility services”). 
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provide gambling disorder benefits or they access state-funded gambling disorder 
benefits. 
However, due to the DSM-5’s addition of hoarding disorder and premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder and its reclassification of gambling disorder to the Substance-
Related and Addictive Disorders chapter, the story may be very different for years 
2017 and beyond in jurisdictions in which coverage for these disorders is not already 
an essential health benefit. On February 27, 2015, HHS required states to select a 
new benchmark plan for the 2017 plan year.108 The deadline for that selection was 
June 1, 2015.109 Assuming that benchmark plans are now analyzed using the DSM-
5, then any benchmark plan that internally references the DSM-5 or is interpreted 
using the DSM-5 would likely mandate coverage of hoarding disorder, premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder, and gambling disorder, unless these conditions are specifically 
excluded from coverage. Nevada’s 2017 benchmark plan, for example, includes 
“mental/behavioral health services” other than the “impulse control disorders.” 
Because the DSM-5 no longer categorizes gambling disorder as an impulse control 
disorder, inpatient and outpatient treatments for all three conditions likely are now 
essential health benefits in Nevada.110 
The above discussion focused on the minimum benefits that must be offered by 
health plans that are required to comply with the EHB requirements set forth in the 
ACA. Of course, health plans may voluntarily provide benefits above the federal 
minimum, and many do. Indeed, many health plans simply tie their benefits to the 
current version of the DSM. For example, the Tufts Health Plan Coverage 
Guidelines for Outpatient Psychotherapy (“Coverage Guidelines”) allow for 
coverage of psychotherapy when “clinical data provide clear evidence of signs and 
symptoms consistent with a mental health or substance use disorder as defined in 
the most recent DSM.”111 These Coverage Guidelines further state, “Medically 
Necessary Outpatient psychotherapy services are covered for the diagnosis and 
treatment of mental health and substance abuse disorders specified in the most recent 
                                                 
108 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment 
Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,812–13 (Feb. 27, 2015). 
109 See, e.g., JoAnn Volk, States Need to Select Essential Health Benefit Benchmark 
Plans for 2017 Soon!, GEO. U. HEALTH POL’Y INST. (May 7, 2015), 
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/all/states-need-select-essential-health-benefit-benchmark-plans-
2017-soon/, archived at http://perma.cc/UQU5-V7GV; Essential Health Benefits, NEV. DIV. 
OF INS., DEP’T OF BUS. AND INDUS., http://doi.nv.gov/Healthcare-Reform/Individuals-
Families/Essential-Health-Benefits/, archived at http://perma.cc/X9G6-DF2X (illustrating 
Nevada’s benchmark plan selection for 2017) (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
110 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NEVADA 2017 EHB BENCHMARK PLAN 
3, available at http://doi.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/doinvgov/_public-documents/Healthcare-
Reform/HHS%20Final%202017%20NV%20EHB%20Benchmark%20Plan.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/VER5-N4SM (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
111 TUFTS HEALTH PLAN, COVERAGE GUIDELINES FOR OUTPATIENT PSYCHOTHERAPY 1 
(2014), available at http://www.tuftshealthplan.com/providers/ pdf/mng/outpatient_psycho 
therapy.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J9YD-TC5C. 
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM).”112 The APA’s addition of hoarding 
disorder and premenstrual dysphoric disorder to the DSM-5 would result in these 
conditions being newly covered under the Tufts Health Plan as long as the treatment, 
service, or procedure recommended by the treating mental health professional is 
medically necessary. Gambling disorder also would be covered, although its 
predecessor (pathological gambling) would have been covered in the past by virtue 
of its inclusion in the DSM-IV-TR. 
By further example, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center for Kids 
Pennsylvania CHIP Program Plan (“UPMC for Kids Plan”) excludes “[a]ny service 
related to disorders that are not treatable Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) defined mental disorders according to the most recent version of 
DSM.”113 Since hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and gambling 
disorder are listed in the DSM-5, they would appear to fall outside this exclusion 
and would also be covered under the UPMC for Kids Plan. 
 
IV.  DISABILITY BENEFIT LAW 
 
The previous Part showed how the addition of new disorders and the 
reclassification of existing disorders in the DSM-5 can significantly affect health 
insurance coverage. This Part focuses on the impact of the DSM on the application 
of public and private disability benefit law.114 As background, disability benefits can 
be public, such as the cash disability benefits provided by the Social Security 
Administration to individuals who meet the Social Security Act’s (SSA) definition 
of disability.115 Disability benefits also can be private, such as the cash disability 
benefits provided by administrators of short-and long-term disability insurance plans 
to individuals who participate in such plans as a benefit of employment or who 
purchase such plans on the open insurance market.116 Illustrative cases involving 
disability claimants with hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and 
gambling disorder are discussed below. 
 
                                                 
112 Id. 
113 UPMC FOR KIDS, EXCLUSIONS 1 (2013), available at http://www.upmchealthplan. 
com/docs/inf/chip_exclusions.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FEF3-Y97W. 
114 The next three paragraphs were first printed in Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle, supra 
note 6, at 224–25. Technical and conforming changes have been made. 
115 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1), (2) (2012). 
116 Disability income insurance protects an individual’s income. If an individual 
becomes unable to work due to a sickness or injury, disability income insurance provides 
cash benefits that the individual may use to pay for housing, food, clothing, and utilities, 
among other living expenses. Designed to provide financial security until the individual 
returns to work, disability income insurance typically pays a monthly cash benefit after an 
initial waiting period that is equivalent to a percentage of the individual’s salary. See, e.g., 
Disability Insurance Overview, METLIFE, https://www.metlife.com/individual/insurance/ 
disability-insurance/index.html, archived at https://perma.cc/4NS8-UCAG (last visited Mar. 
21, 2015). 
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A.  Public Disability Benefits 
 
Title II of the SSA provides for the payment of federal Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits to certain individuals with physical and mental 
disabilities.117 The SSA defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 
mental impairment.”118 An applicant’s impairment or impairments must be “of such 
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering 
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial 
gainful work which exists in the national economy.”119 The applicant’s impairment 
must have lasted or be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve 
months, or be expected to result in death.120 
The commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) has established a five-
step sequential evaluation for determining whether an individual has a disability that 
qualifies for the receipt of SSDI benefits.121 First, a determination is made regarding 
whether the individual is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” If so, benefits are 
denied.122 Second, if the individual is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, a 
determination is made regarding whether the individual has a medically severe 
impairment or combination of impairments. If the individual does not have a severe 
impairment or combination of impairments, benefits are denied.123 Third, if the 
individual has a severe impairment, a determination is made regarding whether the 
impairment meets or equals one of a number of “listed impairments” in 20 C.F.R. 
part 404, subpart P, appendix 1. If the impairment meets or equals a “listed 
impairment,” the individual is conclusively presumed to have a disability.124 Fourth, 
if the impairment does not meet or equal a “listed impairment,” a determination is 
made regarding whether the impairment prevents the individual from performing 
past relevant work. If the individual can perform past relevant work, benefits are 
denied.125 Fifth, if the individual cannot perform past relevant work, the burden 
shifts to the Commissioner to show that the individual is able to perform other kinds 
of work. The individual is entitled to SSDI benefits only if the person is unable to 
perform other work.126  
                                                 
117 See, e.g., Locher v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992). 
118 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 
119 Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). 
120 Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). 
121 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2014) (listing the five-step sequential evaluation 
process); id. § 416.920(a)(4) (explaining the five-step sequential evaluation process); see 
also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140–42 (1987) (explaining the five-step sequential 
evaluation process in the context of a particular claimant). 
122 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). 
123 Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 
124 Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). 
125 Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). 
126 Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). 
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Neither Congress in the SSA nor the HHS in the Social Security 
Administration’s implementing regulations expressly exclude individuals with 
hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, or gambling disorder from 
qualifying for SSDI benefits.127 Instead, SSDI claimants with hoarding disorder, 
premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and gambling disorder, like most other SSDI 
claimants, are assessed using the case-by-case, five-step sequential evaluation 
process. 
Unlike health insurance coverage, discussed in Part III, research does not reveal 
that additions to or reclassifications within the DSM-5 are determinative with 
respect to public disability benefit eligibility. Instead, the presence of a physical or 
mental impairment is simply a predicate to a more important legal determination; 
specifically, whether the individual’s impairment is of such severity that the 
individual cannot do his or her previous work and cannot perform other substantial 
gainful work that exists in the national economy. 
For example, in Bakke v. Colvin,128 Cynthia Bakke sought judicial review of 
the Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for SSDI benefits.129 In a 
hearing held in August 2011, prior to the publication of the DSM-5 and the manual’s 
inclusion of premenstrual dysphoric disorder, an administrative law judge (ALJ) 
found that Bakke had premenstrual dysphoric disorder as well as other mental 
disorders.130 However, the ALJ did not find Bakke’s statements regarding the 
limiting effects of the symptoms of her disorder to be credible; therefore, the ALJ 
“concluded that Bakke had the residual functional capacity” to work.131 On review, 
the District Court of Minnesota agreed, finding a lack of objective and subjective 
evidence in the medical record to substantiate Bakke’s claims regarding the severity 
and limiting effect of her symptoms.132 
Because the ALJ found that Bakke had a mental impairment even though her 
mental condition was not yet listed in the DSM-5, this case demonstrates that the 
DSM is not determinative with respect to the issue of whether an SSDI claimant has 
a qualifying mental impairment. This case also demonstrates how SSDI claimants 
have an additional burden; that is, the burden to prove the existence of severe work 
limitations. The DSM-5 is not helpful in this regard. 
Other cases support these points. In Young v. Colvin,133 Tanya Black Young 
sought review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying her SSDI benefits.134 
                                                 
127 The 1996 amendments to the SSA provide, however, that “[a]n individual shall not 
be considered to be disabled . . . if alcoholism or drug addiction would . . . be a contributing 
factor material to the Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C) (2012); Johansen v. Astrue, No. 10-2076 (DWF/SER), 2011 WL 
4583828, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2011). 
128 No. 12–538 (JNE/TNL), 2013 WL 4436178 (D. Minn. Aug. 16, 2013). 
129 Id. at *1. 
130 Id. at *1–2. 
131 Id. at *1. 
132 Id. at *5. 
133 No. 2:11CV889-CSC, 2013 WL 1336798 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2013). 
134 Id. at *1 
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In a hearing held during November 2009, before the publication of the DSM-5, an 
ALJ found that Young had certain impairments, including osteoarthritis, but that she 
did not have other impairments, including premenstrual dysphoric disorder, 
dysmenorrhea, and menorrhagia.135 The ALJ also found that Young had residual 
functional work capacity.136 Even though the DSM-5 had not yet been released, the 
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama held that the ALJ committed 
reversible error when the ALJ failed to consider Young’s subjective testimony about 
the limiting effects of her premenstrual dysphoric disorder, dysmenorrhea, and 
menorrhagia, and when the ALJ failed to explain why he did not account for these 
limiting effects in determining Young’s residual functional capacity.137 This case 
demonstrates that the lack of inclusion of a condition in the current edition of the 
DSM has little relevance to a determination regarding whether an SSDI claimant’s 
ability to work is severely limited by that condition. 
Similarly, in Best v. Astrue,138 Mary Elizabeth Best sought review of the 
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for SSDI benefits.139 In a 
hearing held during June 2007, prior to the publication of the DSM-5, an ALJ found 
that Best had obesity and depressive disorder, but that she did not have premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder.140 The District Court for the Western District of Washington 
upheld the ALJ’s finding on the ground that Best failed to offer evidence by “an 
acceptable medical source” of her premenstrual dysphoric disorder.141 Best had 
offered a handwritten note authored by a mental health counselor but not a medical 
record by a physician or other provider considered acceptable by the Social Security 
Administration.142 In addition, Best failed to offer any evidence of any work 
limitations caused by her premenstrual dysphoric disorder.143 The lack of inclusion 
of premenstrual dysphoric disorder in the then-current edition of the DSM (DSM-
IV-TR) played no role in either of these findings. Again, this case illustrates that the 
lack of inclusion of a condition in the current edition of the DSM has little relevance 
to a judicial determination regarding whether an SSDI claimant has an impairment 
or whether the claimant’s ability to work is severely limited by the alleged 
impairment.  
Likewise, in Banta v. Astrue,144 Lisa Linnette Banta sought review of the 
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for SSDI benefits.145 In a 
hearing held during September 2010, an ALJ found that Banta had some severe 
impairments, including seizure disorder, hypertension, and migraine headaches, but 
                                                 
135 Id. at *2.  
136 Id. 
137 Id. at *8. 
138 No. C10-836-MJP-BAT, 2010 WL 5185446 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2010). 
139 Id. at *1.  
140 Id. 
141 Id. at *2. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at *2–3. 
144 No. EDCV 11-1302 JPR, 2012 WL 1967763 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2012). 
145 Id. at *1. 
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that she did not have other alleged impairments, including hoarding disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and back pain.146 Although obsessive-compulsive 
disorder was listed in the then-current edition of the DSM (the DSM-IV-TR), the 
ALJ still found that Banta did not present objective medical evidence supporting her 
alleged obsessive-compulsive disorder.147 And, although hoarding disorder was not 
yet listed in the DSM-IV-TR, this lack of listing was not relevant to the ALJ’s 
determination, either. In summary, this case demonstrates that the inclusion (or lack 
thereof) of a condition in the current edition of the DSM has little relevance to a 
determination regarding whether an SSDI claimant’s ability to work is severely 
limited by such condition. 
 
B.  Private Disability Benefits 
 
The cases discussed in Part IV(A) involved applications for public disability 
(SSDI) benefits. Many individuals also have private disability income insurance 
plans that provide short- and long-term cash disability insurance benefits pursuant 
to the contractual language set forth in the plans. One question is whether changes 
in the DSM-5 will affect the interpretation of these disability plans. The answer 
depends on the contractual language set forth in each private disability plan as 
applied to the applicant.  
For example, in Reid v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, Co.,148 defendant MetLife 
administered a long-term disability plan (“Plan”) that distinguished between 
physical and mental disabilities by providing long-term disability benefits for 
participants with permanent physical disabilities but only two years of disability 
benefits for participants with “Mental or Nervous Disorders or Diseases.”149 The 
question before the court was whether the claimant had a physical or mental 
disability. The Plan referenced the then-current edition of the DSM (the DSM-IV-
TR) for purposes of determining whether a claimant had a physical or mental 
disability.150 
Although Reid involved a claimant who had dementia, not the conditions that 
are the subject of this Article, one could imagine how the DSM-5 could positively 
impact private disability benefit determinations in cases involving individuals with 
hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and gambling disorder if those 
individuals were insured under a plan like the plan in Reid. That is, consider a private 
disability benefit plan that provides disability benefits to individuals with disorders 
listed in the “current version of the DSM.” Since hoarding disorder, premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder, and gambling disorder are listed in the DSM-5, individuals with 
                                                 
146 Id. at *2. 
147 Id. 
148 944 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ga. 2013). 
149 Id. at 1282. 
150 Id. (referencing the Plan provision stating that “Mental or Nervous Disorder or 
Disease means a medical condition which meets the diagnostic criteria set forth in the most 
recent edition of the Diagnostic And Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as of the date of 
Your Disability” (emphasis omitted)). 
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these conditions may become eligible for disability benefits if they can prove that 
they are also unable to work as a result of these conditions. 
Proving this latter requirement—an inability to work as a result of a 
disability—is not always easy. For example, in Reilly v. Northwestern Mutual Life 
Insurance Co.,151 plaintiff Michael Reilly sought to receive monthly cash benefits 
under his private disability income insurance policy issued by defendant 
Northwestern Mutual.152 As background, Reilly was an attorney with gambling 
disorder whose license to practice law was revoked by the Iowa Supreme Court after 
he misappropriated over $90,000 of a client’s trust funds to pay for his own personal 
gambling debts.153 Benefits were payable under Reilly’s disability income insurance 
policy if: (1) the insured became “disabled” while the policy was in effect; (2) the 
insured was under the care of a licensed physician other than himself when he had 
the disability; (3) the insured’s disability resulted from an “accident or sickness”; 
and (4) the insured’s alleged disability was not otherwise excluded under the 
policy.154 
Gambling disorder was not specifically included or excluded from the 
definition of disability under Reilly’s disability policy.155 Reilly thus argued that his 
gambling disorder constituted a disabling “sickness,” that he developed this 
disabling sickness while his disability income insurance policy was in effect, that he 
was under the care of a physician, and that his sickness caused him to lose his license 
to practice law, thus necessitating cash income benefits.156 In opposition, defendant 
Northwestern Mutual argued that it was not obligated to pay Reilly cash benefits 
because his inability to perform his occupation resulted not from an accident or 
sickness but, instead, criminal or other illegal conduct; that is, Reilly 
misappropriated his clients’ trust funds.157 Neither party referenced the current 
edition of the DSM (the DSM-IV-TR), which included pathological gambling as a 
disorder in the impulse control disorders chapter) to argue that Reilly’s gambling 
addiction should or should not make him eligible for disability benefits.  
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa agreed with 
defendant Northwestern Mutual, citing analogous case law holding that an insured’s 
loss of income caused by a legal consequence of the insured’s behavior, such as the 
loss of the insured’s license to practice law that followed from the insured’s 
misappropriation of client trust fund accounts, is not a disability.158 The court 
ultimately found that Reilly “was not disabled by the gambling addiction, only by 
                                                 
151 No. 1-06-CV-14-CRWRAW, 2007 WL 1485103 (S.D. Iowa May 16, 2007). 
152 Id. The next four paragraphs were first printed in Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle, supra 
note 6, at 228–30. Technical and conforming changes have been made. 
153 Reilly, 2007 WL 1485103, at *1. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at *2.  
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. (citing Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Millstein, 129 F.3d 688 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Zembko v. Nw. Mut. Life. Ins. Co., No. 3:05CV918(AHN), 2007 WL 948323 (D. Conn. 
Mar. 26, 2007)). 
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the license revocation,” pointing to the fact that he “would still be practicing law” 
with his full income, “notwithstanding his excessive gambling, except for his 
wrongful conversion of client funds.”159 The court reasoned that the public policy of 
the State of Iowa required such a finding.160 The result might have been different, 
however, had Reilly not testified at his license revocation hearing that he had 
overcome his gambling disorder with treatment.161 Indeed, the court went on to 
suggest that disability benefits might be payable in situations in which the work life 
of a professional is ended only by addiction, not by a license revocation or other 
criminal or illegal act.162 This case supports the principles identified in Part IV(A), 
including the lack of determinativeness of the DSM in disability benefit proceedings. 
Indeed, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa’s 
suggestion proved true in McClaugherty v. Unum Life Insurance Co. of America.163 
In McClaugherty, plaintiff John McClaugherty sued Unum Life Insurance Company 
following its denial of McClaugherty’s application for short-term disability 
benefits.164 McClaugherty had been diagnosed with gambling disorder among other 
comorbid disorders including bipolar affective disorder, alcohol use disorder, and 
substance use disorder.165 McClaugherty had not, however, engaged in any criminal 
or other illegal acts; instead, he simply resigned from his employment in order to 
enter a treatment center for his gambling disorder and other comorbid disorders, and 
then he applied for short-term cash disability benefits to pay for such treatment.166 
Defendant Unum tried to argue that McClaugherty did not have a disability within 
the meaning of the policy. On review, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of West Virginia found that defendant Unum failed to consider 
important medical record evidence showing that McClaugherty had received 
intensive outpatient treatment for his gambling and comorbid disorders that would 
corroborate his disability claim.167 The court ultimately remanded the case, 
instructing defendant Unum to explicitly consider a particular set of outpatient 
                                                 
159 Id. at *3. 
160 Id. at *2–3. The court quoted Millstein, in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated, “[A] rule which would allow a lawyer to steal from his clients, even when such theft 
occurs in the throes of a drug addiction, and then recover disability benefits for income lost 
due to the [license] suspension resulting from such theft, would be against public policy.” Id. 
(quoting Millstein, 129 F.3d at 691). 
161 See id. at *3 (“Plaintiff so testified at his license revocation hearing and by 
deposition; treatment for his addiction had overcome his gambling habit.”). 
162 Id. (“This is consistent with public policy that does not allow recovery on a disability 
insurance policy when license revocation, not a treatable addiction, ends the work life of a 
professional.”). 
163 No. 2:09-cv-01292, 2010 WL 2787632 (S.D.W. Va. July 14, 2010).  
164 Id. at *1. 
165 Id. at *1–3. 
166 Id. at *1. 
167 Id. at *4. 
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treatment records as evidence of McClaugherty’s disability.168 The DSM was not 
relevant to any of the court’s rulings. 
 
V.  DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW 
 
Parts III and IV of this Article analyzed the potential impact of the DSM-5 on 
health insurance coverage and public and private disability benefit eligibility. This 
Part focuses on the potential impact of the DSM-5 on protection under federal and 
state disability discrimination law. 
As I explain in detail elsewhere,169 a range of antidiscrimination protections 
and accommodations are available to qualified individuals who have physical and 
mental disabilities under a variety of federal and state laws.170 Signed into law by 
President Richard Nixon on September 26, 1973, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act prohibits employers and organizations that receive federal financial assistance 
from discriminating on the basis of disability against qualified individuals with 
disabilities.171 The original Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), signed 
into law by President George H.W. Bush on July 26, 1990, prohibits certain 
employers, state and local government agencies, and places of public 
accommodation from discriminating on the basis of disability against qualified 
individuals with disabilities.172 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), 
signed into law by President George W. Bush on September 25, 2008, clarifies that 
the ADA’s definition of disability should be broadly construed in favor of 
individuals with physical and mental impairments who seek protection and generally 
shall not require extensive analysis.173 State laws such as the California Fair Housing 
and Employment Act also provide individuals with protection from harassment and 
discrimination in the contexts of housing and employment because of physical or 
mental disability.174  
                                                 
168 Id.  
169 See, e.g., Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle, supra note 6, at 230–38. 
170 The background information regarding disability discrimination law set forth in this 
paragraph and the next paragraph was first published in Tovino, Lost in the Shuffle, supra 
note 6, at 230–32. Technical and conforming changes have been made. 
171 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2012)) (“No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in 
the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
172 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).  
173 ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 705–706 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
174 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015). 
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To determine whether an individual is entitled to protection under one of these 
statutes, each statute’s definition of “disability” must be examined.175 For example, 
the ADAAA uses a three-prong definition of disability including, with respect to an 
individual: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”176 The ADAAA explains that the 
definition of disability in the ADAAA “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage 
of individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of [the 
ADAAA].”177 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has stated in 
guidance documents interpreting the ADAAA’s predecessor, the ADA, that the 
current edition of the DSM is relevant for identifying qualifying mental 
impairments.178 Courts interpreting disability discrimination law also have stated 
that weight may be given to the DSM in determining which impairments qualify as 
mental impairments.179 However, a finding of a “mental impairment” is not 
determinative of a plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim. The plaintiff still must 
prove that she is a “qualified individual” with a disability and that a covered entity 
has discriminated against her “on the basis of disability.”180 The term “qualified 
individual” means that the individual “satisfies the requisite skill, experience, 
education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position such 
individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of such position.”181 The requirement that the 
individual be discriminated against “on the basis of disability” means that the 
individual was not discriminated against for some other reason unrelated to 
disability. 
                                                 
175 The definitions of “disability” that are used by the Social Security Administration 
and by private disability income insurance benefit insurers, discussed in Part IV, are different 
than the definitions used by federal and state antidiscrimination laws and are not applicable 
here. See, e.g., Labit v. Akzo-Nobel Salt, Inc., 209 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished 
table decision) (per curiam) (distinguishing Social Security disability determinations from 
ADA disability determinations and noting, for example, that Social Security disability 
determinations do not take into account workplace accommodations). 
176 ADAAA § 3, 122 Stat. at 3555 (emphasis added). 
177 Id.  
178 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON 
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, EEOC NOTICE 
NO. 915.002 (1997) [hereinafter EEOC NOTICE], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/psych.html, archived at http://perma.cc/KTQ4-VGJY (“The current edition of the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(now the fourth-edition, DSM-IV) is relevant for identifying these disorders.”). 
179 E.g., Boldini v. Postmaster Gen. U.S. Postal Serv., 928 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.H. 
1995) (“As plaintiff correctly points out, in circumstances of mental impairment, a court may 
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A few disability discrimination cases have been brought by individuals with 
hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, and gambling disorder. The 
DSM was not dispositive of, or even relevant to, the outcomes of these cases. In 
Marzano v. Universal Studio, Inc.,182 for example, plaintiff Damon Marzano sued 
Universal Studio, Inc., his former employer, arguing that he was terminated from his 
job as a mailroom clerk in violation of federal and state disability discrimination 
law.183 Marzano, who had obsessive-compulsive disorder, including extreme 
hoarding behaviors, was unable to stop taking items from the garbage at work even 
though he had been instructed not to take items from the garbage.184 Marzano also 
admitted that his need to hoard interfered with his job duties, including keeping the 
mailroom tidy and orderly, and that his compulsions made him arrive late to work 
and delayed the completion of tasks, such as sealing envelopes.185  
Although its opinion was published a decade before the release of the DSM-5, 
neither the plaintiff’s employer nor the United States District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts objected to Marzano’s characterization of his hoarding as a 
disability. Instead, the court found that he was unable to carry his burden of proving 
that he could perform the essential functions of his job with or without 
accommodation.186 With respect to his inability to stop collecting garbage from the 
trash, the court specifically explained that “[a]n obligation to refrain from engaging 
in certain behaviors or activities is as much a part of a job’s essential functions as 
the adequate performance of assigned tasks.”187 The court also held that he failed to 
identify any accommodation that would have made him capable of complying with 
his employer’s workplace rules.188 As in other cases discussed in Part IV of this 
Article, a finding that Marzano had a mental impairment was a simple predicate to 
a more important legal determination; specifically, whether Marzano could prove 
that he could perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable 
accommodation.189 The APA’s inclusion of hoarding disorder in the DSM-5 would 
not have changed the outcome of this case. 
The same is true of cases involving premenstrual dysphoric disorder. In Bielich 
v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.,190 plaintiff Norma Bielich sued her employer under 
several statues, including the ADA.191 In relevant part, Bielich alleged that her 
employer failed to accommodate her disability, which was premenstrual dysphoric 
disorder.192 The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
assumed for purposes of summary judgment disposition that Bielich was a qualified 
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individual with a disability who could perform the essential functions of her job.193 
As a result, the court focused solely on whether she could prove that her employer’s 
proffered reasons for her termination were a pretext for disability discrimination.194 
As with the previous case, the APA’s inclusion of premenstrual dysphoric disorder 
in the DSM-5 could not be used to answer this question and therefore would not 
have impacted the outcome of the case. 
Similarly, in Millington v. Temple University School of Dentistry,195 an 
academically uncompetitive dental student with premenstrual dysphoric disorder 
and other physical and mental disabilities sued her school under the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of her 
disabilities.196 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that 
the student failed to provide documentation of her alleged disabilities and that some 
of the medical records that she did provide contradicted her disability claims.197 The 
Third Circuit also found that even if the student did prove that she had a disability, 
she failed to meet her burden of proving that she was otherwise qualified to 
participate in the dental school’s program.198 Finally, the Third Circuit found that 
even after the dental school accommodated all of the student’s requests, including 
by providing a dental assistant for her clinical duties, the student’s academic 
performance did not improve.199 The DSM-5 would not have impacted any of these 
determinations. 
The above cases involved individuals with hoarding disorder and premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder. Cases involving individuals with gambling disorder are different 
because Congress expressly excludes the condition it calls “compulsive gambling” 
(as well as kleptomania and pyromania, all three of which were classified in the 
impulse control disorders chapter of the DSM-IV-TR) from the definition of 
disability.200 Many state disability discrimination laws also continue to exclude 
individuals with gambling disorder from protected status. For example, the 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act,201 which was designed “to protect 
and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold 
employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of . . . physical 
disability, mental disability,” and other indicators,202 continues to exclude 
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“compulsive gambling” from the definition of both “mental disability”203 and 
“physical disability.”204 
The courts have upheld these exclusions in cases in which they have been 
challenged. For example, in Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Systems,205 which 
involved a plaintiff with gambling disorder and other mental disorders, the United 
States District Court for the District of Arizona was unsympathetic to the plaintiff’s 
claim that his gambling disorder should be protected under the ADA: “Congress 
expressly excluded compulsive gambling . . . from the ADA’s definition of 
disability.”206 The court published its opinion in Trammell in 2010, thirty years after 
the APA first introduced pathological gambling in the DSM-III. The inclusion of 
pathological gambling in the DSM clearly has no impact on the treatment of 
individuals with gambling disorder under the ADA. 
The EEOC also appears unsympathetic toward individuals with gambling 
disorder.207 In a guidance document interpreting the original ADA that was released 
by the EEOC in 1997, seventeen years after the APA first introduced pathological 
gambling in the DSM-III, the EEOC explained, with respect to which conditions 
constituted mental impairments: 
 
The current edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (now the fourth edition, DSM-
IV) is relevant for identifying these disorders. The DSM-IV has been 
recognized as an important reference by courts and is widely used by 
American mental health professionals for diagnostic and insurance 
reimbursement purposes. 
 
Not all conditions listed in the DSM-IV, however, are disabilities, or even 
impairments, for purposes of the ADA. For example, the DSM-IV lists 
several conditions that Congress expressly excluded from the ADA’s 
definition of “disability.”208 
 
In a prior publication, I spent a considerable amount of time using 
neuroscience, economics, and principles of biomedical ethics to argue that 
individuals with gambling disorder should have the same legal protections as 
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individuals with substance-related and other addictive disorders under disability 
discrimination law.209 In that work, I specifically pointed out that the APA’s move 
of gambling disorder away from the impulse control disorders chapter and into the 
Substance-Related and Addictive Disorder chapter signaled that gambling disorder 
should be treated like other substance-related and addictive conditions under the 
law.210 In addition, I formally proposed the amendment of federal and state disability 
discrimination laws in ways that would protect individuals with gambling 
disorder.211  
Other gaming scholars also have argued that advances in the scientific 
understanding of gambling disorder call for reconsideration of the exclusion in 
disability discrimination law. Professors Christian Hardigree, Bo Bernhard, and 
Shannon Bybee at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, have argued, for example, 
that the ADA exception for gambling disorder should be reexamined due to 
advances in the scientific understanding of the condition.212 Professors Hardigree, 
Bernhard, and Bybee explain: 
 
While debates over these issues are ongoing . . . , it is becoming less clear 
why “compulsive” gambling is specifically excluded by the ADA. As the 
psychological and medical community increasingly embraces pathological 
gambling as a legitimate and potentially devastating disorder, it seems that 
we would be wise to allow ADA mechanisms to respond accordingly. The 
time has come for a thoughtful and scientifically informed re-evaluation 
of pathological gambling’s ADA status.213 
 
Although my research has not yet revealed a lawmaker, lobbyist, or litigant 
who has tried to use the DSM-5’s reclassification of gambling disorder to challenge 
its exclusion under disability discrimination law, I do anticipate that lawmakers, 
lobbyists, and litigants will make these types of arguments in the near future. For 
purposes of this Article, however, it must be noted that the DSM-5’s reclassification 
of gambling disorder has not yet affected the lack of protection given to individuals 
with the disorder. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has attempted to assess the impact of changes in the DSM-5 on 
three areas of health law, including health insurance law, disability benefit law, and 
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disability discrimination law. This Article has shown how the addition of new 
disorders and the reclassification of existing disorders in the DSM-5 can 
significantly impact the application of federal and state mental health parity laws, 
mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefit laws, as well as the 
interpretation of health insurance contracts. That is, federal mental health parity law, 
some state benchmark plans, and some health insurance contracts incorporate by 
reference the current edition of the DSM when identifying conditions that are 
eligible for parity protections, mandatory benefits, and insurance coverage, 
respectively. 
On the other hand, this Article also has demonstrated how the DSM-5 is not 
determinative with respect to the outcome of public disability benefit cases. In public 
disability benefit cases, the presence of a physical or mental impairment is simply a 
predicate to a more important legal determination; namely, whether the individual’s 
impairment is of such severity that the individual cannot do his or her previous work 
and cannot perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national 
economy. This secondary legal determination is made based on proof provided by 
the claimant of the claimant’s work limitations. Claimants who fail to provide 
objective evidence regarding their work limitations will not prevail regardless of 
whether their underlying conditions are listed in the current edition of the DSM. 
This Article has further demonstrated how the DSM-5 is not necessarily 
determinative with respect to the outcome of private disability benefit cases, either. 
Although some private disability plans internally reference the current edition of the 
DSM for purposes of determining whether an insured has a mental disability, this 
finding of disability may be a predicate to other legal determinations, such as 
whether the disability makes the insured unable to work. In many cases, courts agree 
that the insured has a disability but find that something else, such as the insured’s 
commission of a crime, makes the individual unable to work. In these cases, the 
insured is not eligible for contractual disability benefits even if the insured’s 
disability is listed in the current edition of the DSM. 
As a final descriptive matter, this Article has demonstrated how changes in the 
DSM-5 have not yet impacted disability discrimination cases, at least in cases 
involving individuals with hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, or 
gambling disorder. Although hoarding disorder and premenstrual dysphoric disorder 
were considered disabilities even before the publication of the DSM-5, individuals 
with gambling disorder are excluded from protection under federal and state 
antidiscrimination law even after the DSM-5. In addition, all individuals with 
disabilities still bear the burden of proving that they are qualified individuals with 
disabilities who can perform the essential functions of their jobs with or without 
reasonable accommodation. The DSM-5 is unhelpful with respect to these and other 
similar requirements. 
In addition, this Article agrees with the APA’s cautionary statement regarding 
legal uses of the DSM-5.214 In the beginning of the DSM-5, the APA explains that 
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the diagnostic criteria and textual descriptions in the DSM-5 can be useful for certain 
limited legal purposes:  
 
When used appropriately, diagnoses and diagnostic information can assist 
legal decision makers in their determinations. For example, when the 
presence of a mental disorder is the predicate for a subsequent legal 
determination (e.g., involuntary civil commitment), the use of an 
established system of diagnosis enhances the value and reliability of the 
determination. By providing a compendium based on a review of the 
pertinent clinical and research literature, DSM-5 may facilitate legal 
decision makers’ understanding of the relevant characteristics of mental 
disorders.215 
 
However, the APA emphasizes the risks and limitations of using the DSM-5 in 
forensic settings: 
 
When DSM-5 categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed 
for forensic purposes, there is a risk that diagnostic information will be 
misused or misunderstood. These dangers arise because of the imperfect 
fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the 
information contained in a clinical diagnosis. In most situations, the 
clinical diagnosis of a DSM-5 mental disorder such as intellectual 
disability (intellectual developmental disorder), schizophrenia, major 
neurocognitive disorder, gambling disorder, or pedophilic disorder does 
not imply that an individual with such a condition meets legal criteria for 
the presence of a mental disorder or a specified legal standard (e.g., for 
competence, criminal responsibility, or disability). For the latter, 
additional information is usually required beyond that contained in the 
DSM-5 diagnosis, which might include information about the individual’s 
functional impairments and how these impairments affect the particular 
abilities in question. It is precisely because impairments, abilities, and 
disabilities vary widely within each diagnostic category that assignment 
of a particular diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or 
disability.216 
 
Finally, the APA also advises against the use of the DSM-5 by nonclinical personnel: 
 
Use of DSM-5 to assess for the presence of a mental disorder by 
nonclinical, nonmedical, or otherwise insufficiently trained individuals is 
not advised. Nonclinical decision makers should also be cautioned that a 
diagnosis does not carry any necessary implications regarding the etiology 
or causes of the individual’s mental disorder or the individual’s degree of 
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control over behaviors that may be associated with the disorder. Even 
when diminished control over one’s behavior is a feature of the disorder, 
having the diagnosis in itself does not demonstrate that a particular 
individual is (or was) unable to control his or her behavior at a particular 
time.217 
 
In agreement (and in keeping) with these cautionary statements, this Article 
concludes by identifying four permissible uses and possible abuses of the DSM-5 in 
civil and administrative health law proceedings. 
First, attorneys and judges should continue to legally interpret health insurance 
contracts that internally reference the DSM and make related legal arguments and 
decisions regarding the coverage of particular conditions. For example, a lawyer 
who represents a plaintiff who has been diagnosed by a mental health professional 
with hoarding disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, or gambling disorder in a 
dispute involving an insurance contract that provides coverage for “all mental 
disorders listed in the DSM-5” should feel comfortable arguing that the client’s 
disorder is covered under the terms of the contract. The lawyer’s argument is a legal 
argument, not a clinical decision. On the other hand, a judge should be cautioned 
against using the DSM to make his or her own decision about whether a plaintiff has 
a listed condition. Instead, the judge should rely on the medical evidence presented 
by the plaintiff’s treating clinicians. 
Second, in the context of public disability benefit disputes, attorneys, ALJs, 
and reviewing courts should continue to apply the five-factor analysis set forth by 
the Social Security Commissioner for determinations regarding SSDI benefit 
eligibility, as discussed in Part IV(A). The DSM-5 may be helpful in the second of 
the five steps; that is, in identifying the criteria required for a diagnosis of a mental 
impairment, which may aid the plaintiff’s attorney in her request for medical 
documentation of the impairment from the plaintiff’s treating physicians. However, 
attorneys, ALJs, and reviewing courts must recognize that SSDI benefit eligibility 
depends on a number of other legal determinations that the DSM-5 cannot answer, 
including whether the individual is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity, 
whether the impairment prevents the individual from performing past relevant work 
and, if it gets to this point, whether the Commissioner has carried the burden of 
proving that the individual is able to perform other kinds of work in the national 
economy. An attorney, ALJ, or reviewing court would abuse the DSM-5 if the 
attorney, judge, or court argued or determined that the claimant would be eligible 
for SSDI benefits based solely on a claimant’s DSM-5 diagnosis. 
Third, in the context of private disability benefit disputes, some private 
disability plans do internally reference the DSM for purposes of identifying the 
conditions that constitute a qualifying disability. In these cases, it would be 
permissible for an attorney or judge to consult the current edition of the DSM to 
determine whether the insured’s alleged condition constitutes a qualifying disability. 
However, most private disability plans also require the insured to prove that her 
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disability makes her unable to work. The DSM-5 cannot provide this type of 
evidence and it would be inappropriate for an attorney or judge involved in a private 
disability benefit dispute to argue or determine that an individual is entitled to cash 
disability benefits based only on a DSM-5 diagnosis, or for a judge to decide herself, 
without medical evidence, that the individual has a particular mental disability. 
Fourth, in the context of disability discrimination disputes, the EEOC and the 
courts have stated that the DSM is relevant for purposes of identifying conditions 
that constitute mental impairments.218 However, disability discrimination law also 
requires the plaintiff to plead and prove a number of other factors, such as whether 
the individual is a qualified individual who can perform the essential functions of 
the job with or without reasonable accommodation. In addition, and even though 
this requirement has been substantially watered down by the ADAAA, the text of 
the ADAAA continues to require the individual to at least plead that the individual’s 
disability substantially limits a major life activity. The DSM-5 is not determinative 
of any of these issues. Attorneys and judges involved in disability discrimination 
disputes should be mindful of these additional statutory requirements and should 
take care not to minimize the disability analysis to the question of whether a DSM-
5 diagnosis exists. 
In summary, the DSM-5 has relevance to a number of health law proceedings 
but is not dispositive with respect to any of them except for certain limited health 
insurance coverage questions. Attorneys and judges should be mindful of the ways 
in which the DSM-5 can impact health law proceedings as well as the limitations of 
the DSM-5 with respect to questions of ultimate concern to the law. 
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